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INDUSTRIALISATION: IMPORT SUBSTITUTION 
TO EXPORT PROMOTION 
 
 




Import-substitution policy creates biases in the incentive structure and lowers the 
growth of potential exports in the long run. Trade reforms in this respect are likely to 
reduce the gap between domestic and border prices. The expectation is to bring better 
industrial performance on the lines of comparative advantages. This paper examines 




Neoclassical economic theory focuses on the market or exchange with the assumption 
that the price mechanism works well and allocates resources efficiently. A focus on 
the effectiveness of the market mechanism in allocating resources is a core theme of 
this approach. Promoting foreign trade to access the potential static and dynamic gains 
and removing the widespread inefficiencies in developing countries due to higher 
level of protection are some of the issues that the supporters of the market mechanism 
focus on. In the light of the above argument during the 1980s many developing 
countries initiated economic adjustment programmes and focused on export 
promotion along the lines of comparative advantage.  
 
Economic adjustment package includes reducing public sector activity, reforming 
markets such as international trade, labour, financial and other microeconomic 
activities. For a majority of countries the general picture is that the price system has 
been highly distorted through government intervention. In other words, there was a 
divergence between shadow prices and market prices. It is well established in the 
literature on shadow pricing that the world price will represent the market price. The 
economic adjustment package has been oriented to shifting resources into the export 
sectors by bringing market prices more in line with opportunity costs. Bringing 
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opportunity costs more in line with world prices was felt necessary in shifting 
resources into the export sector.  
  
In recent years neo-classical theory has come to be linked with stabilisation and 
adjustment programmes by world organisations and applied in many developing 
countries. Trade reform has been given a prominent role under stabilisation 
programmes in the expectation that it would promote growth performance and 
efficiency along the lines of comparative advantage; it would also reduce 
monopolistic conditions in domestic markets and reduce price markups. The objective 
of this paper is to study the role of trade strategies in industrialisation. The first three 
sections of this paper deal with trade strategies, government interventions and import-
substituting industrialisation. The rest of the sections deal with export-orientation, 
trade efficiency and conclusion. 
 
TRADE STRATEGIES 
Government intervention in foreign trade is often associated with the concepts 
"Import Substitution" (IS) and ‘Export Promotion’ (EP). The former entails higher 
intervention, the latter less intervention. It is difficult to have a precise definition for 
the concepts IS and EP. Two basic approaches measuring the intensity of intervention 
may be distinguished. One was a single-criterion based on the underlying incentive 
structure; the other is multiple-criteria using choice of trade policy variables. 
 
Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970), Balassa (1971), Bhagwati (1978) and Krueger 
(1978) measured trade strategy by use of an almost identical single criterion. For 
example Bhagwati (1978) treated export promotion as the situation in which 
 
MX EEREER =  
 
where XEER  and MEER  indicate the effective exchange rate for exports and for 
imports respectively. The EER incorporates all form of incentives and disincentives 
offered to the economy (for details see P.15, export orientation: trade liberalisation). 
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Greenaway and Num (1988) adopted a multiple criteria approach.  They argued that a 
single criterion approach is not appropriate for a number of reasons. First, 
classification into import and export sectors is difficult as industries produce a range 
of products. Second, the actual and intended effects of policies may be entirely 
different in developing countries. Third, the evidence suggests that only a few 
economies persistently pursue a strategy through time. The authors noticed that the 
initial stages of industrialisation are characterised by import substitution and that it is 
only after some ‘take off’ point that resources need to be mobilised into higher value-
added activities through export promotion. 
 
Michaely, Papageorgiou and Choksi (1991) adopted multiple criteria and introduced 
liberalisation indices for each country in a study of nineteen countries and twenty-nine 
episodes. The liberalisation indices were constructed for each episodes annually 
during the period studied and were assigned a value ranging from 1 (for the highest 
possible degree of trade intervention) to 20 (for complete trade liberalisation). For 
each episodes intensity was derived based on strength and speed and their 
sustainability1. Various quantitative and qualitative factors were taken into account. 
 
The difficulties in defining trade strategies are reflected in the vast variation in 
approaches to measurement. Between the two extremes, stringent import control and 
export-orientation policy, there exist various degrees of combinations. In brief, trade 
strategy can be defined in terms of changes to incentive structure using a single-
criterion and changes in the choice of trade policy instrument using multiple criteria2. 
However, the single criterion definition is used in most of the literature. 
 
INTERVENTIONS AND PRICE DISTORTIONS 
There are static and dynamic gains of free trade. As a result of exchange of goods and 
services and specialisation there will be more production and income in the line of 
comparative advantages. There will be an increase in saving as a result of rise in 
income, which in turn allows resources to be relocated from the production of 
consumption goods to the capital goods. 
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National governments do often intervene in foreign trade in number of ways. These 
include tariffs, quotas, export barriers, anti dumping duties, local content requirements 
and administrative policies. Among the other reasons, interventions are intended to 
protect domestic industries from foreign competition. It was widely noted that these 
interventions introduce widespread distortions in the pricing system and they pose 
some of the most intriguing policy problems. 
  
 
Interventions in Import 
Tariffs 
A tariff is a tax on importing a good or service into a country, gathered by customs 
officials at the place of entry. Tariffs fall into two categories. A specific tariff is a 
money amount per physical unit of import. For example a $ per ton of textiles. An ad 
valorem tariff is a percentage of the estimated market value of the goods imported. 
For example a 25 per cent of the value of textiles imported. In general, as a result of a 
tariff consumers will end up paying higher prices, buying less of the product or both. 
A tariff brings gains for domestic producers who face import competition. 
 
It is likely that tariffs of importing country result in retaliation from exporting country 
and both countries end up losing most of the gains from trade. Suppose we assume 
that the terms of trade of the nation imposing the tariff improve and those of the trade 
partner deteriorate. Facing both a lower volume of exports and deteriorating terms of 
trade, the trade partner’s welfare declines. As a result the trade partner is likely to 
retaliate and impose a tariff of its own. The volume of trade further declines. If the 
process continues, all nations end up losing most of the gains from trade. 
 
Import Quotas and Voluntary Export Restraints 
The government gives out a limited number of licences to import items legally and 
prohibits importing without a license. A quota gives government officials greater 
administrative flexibility and power. A quota is a shelter against further increases in 
import spending when foreign competition is becoming severe. The quota cuts the 
quantity imported and derives the domestic price of the good up above the world price 
at which the licence holders buy the good abroad. 
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The way in which a quota is allocated will have impact on consumer welfare. 
Competitive auction is the best way.  The competitive auction is likely to yield a price 
for the import licences that roughly equals the difference between the foreign price of 
the imports and the highest home price at which all the licensed imports can be sold. 
In the case of a public auction, the quota system does not cost the nation any more 
than an equivalent tariff.  Allocating quota on a fixed favouritism is the most illogical 
way. In this method the government allocates fixed shares to already established firms 
without competition. A third method is resource-using application procedures. This is 
considered the least efficient way and a non-price method of allocation. For example, 
the quota may be allocated on a first-come first-served basis (Lindert 1996).  
 
A voluntary export restraint is a kind of quota on trade imposed by the exporting 
countries, at the request of the importing countries3. For example, textiles, clothing 
and footwear were subject to voluntary export restraints during the last four decades in 
which importing countries requested the exporting countries to limit their exports to 
them. By agreeing to export restraints, foreign producers/exporters secure their 
minimum export and avoid far more damaging tariffs or quotas by importing 
countries. The Uruguay Round agreement called for the elimination of restraints on 
exports of textiles, clothing and footwear. 
 
The Japanese automobile industry was subject to voluntary export restraints in the 
1980s. USA automobile producers were running low on profit and workers were 
subject to massive job layoffs. There were two options to address the protectionist 
pressure available to USA Congress: imposing quota restrictions on automobile 
imports from Japan, and imposing voluntary export restraints. The first option was out 
of favour as USA leads global progress towards freer trade. Instead, Japan agreed to 
limit its exports to the United States of America. In this case the importing country is 
a powerful country having trouble with facing rising import competition, and forces 
the exporting country to deserve so-called "voluntary" export restraints. Voluntary 
export restraints may benefit Japanese producers by reducing import competition in 
the importing country and raising their price-markup profits. USA consumers do not 
benefit as a result of increase in the prices of imported goods. When imports are 
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limited, this bids the prices up for that limited foreign supply. The world as a whole 
loses as voluntary export restraints limit trade between nations (Hill 1999). 
 
Anti dumping 
The governments of importing countries levy antidumping tariffs against dumping. 
Dumping is a form of international price discrimination in which an exporting firm 
sells its product at a lower price in a foreign market than it charges in its home-
country market. Dumping is considered a method by which firms unload excess 
production in foreign markets. There are two types of dumping. Predatory dumping 
occurs when the firm temporarily discriminates in favour of some foreign buyers with 
the purpose of eliminating some competitors with the intention of later raising its 
prices after the competition is over. Persistent dumping occurs when price 
discrimination goes on forever. 
 
Dumping by an exporting country is often subject to retaliation by the importing 
country. The governments of importing countries levy antidumping tariffs. In a way, 
antidumping policies are designed to punish foreign firms that engaged in dumping. 
The objective is to protect domestic producers from so called “unfair” competition. 
Usually domestic producers file a petition with the appropriate government agencies. 
The government agencies investigate the complaint and, if appropriate, impose the 
antidumping tariff. Such duties are prohibited under the International Antidumping 
Code signed by most parties to the GATT. However, current GATT practices permit 
retaliation against dumping. 
 
An antidumping duty is likely to lower world welfare. It is possible uncompetitive 
domestic producers can call for antidumping duties from firms that may not be 
dumping. In a way this is an excuse for protectionism. In this case antidumping duties 
are like usual tariffs and generate costs to the world and to the importing nation as 
well.     
 
Local Content Requirements 
National governments can require firms to use a specific minimum proportion of 
inputs of a good to be sourced domestically. For example, it was a practice in 
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Australia that 85 per cent of component parts for automobiles, or 85 per cent of the 
value of automobiles must be produced locally. Canada forced the radio and television 
stations to give a certain share of their airtime for local songs and shows. Developing 
countries frequently use this method as a device for promoting local manufactured 
products and components. For example Colombia once allowed the free import of the 
world's best steel on the condition that the buyers should show that they bought 
certain amount of finished steel from Colombian mills. 
 
By limiting foreign competition the producers of local content benefits. Restrictions 
on imports raise the prices of imported contents. Higher prices for imported contents 
raise the cost of the final products produced locally and in turn raise the prices. 
Overall this scheme tend to benefit producers but not consumers. 
 
Administrative Policies 
Some times a range of administrative trade policies or bureaucratic rules can restrict 
imports and boost exports. The resulting delays due to bureaucratic rules can have 
direct impact on imports. Bureaucratic rules benefit producers and harm consumers by 
denying access to superior and lower cost foreign products. 
 
Interventions in Export 
Export interventions are export quotas, export tax and export subsidy. Export quotas 
are rarer, but tend to be more severe, than import quotas. For example to avoid 
national famines governments used to control exports in the past. In the extreme they 
can take the form of an export ban or export embargo, both refers to complete bans or 
economic sanctions. For example United States impose export bans and quotas more 
often than other industrial nations4. Export tax is common, which has effects that are 
symmetrical to those of an import tax. An export tax, in the face of a fixed world 
price, discourages exports and directs supplies back onto the home market, pushing 
down the domestic price. 
 
Exports are often subsidised. For example, governments use taxpayers’ money to give 
low-interest loans to exporters, engage in advertising and export promotion on behalf 
of exporters and give tax relief based on the value of goods or services each firm 
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exports. Lower prices of exports due to subsidy likely to benefit consumers and harm 
producers of importing countries. The governments of importing countries have a 
good reason to protect their producers from unfair competition. They do retaliate by 
imposing a tariff against exporters which is widely known as countervailing duties. 
Higher domestic prices of importing countries as a result of countervailing duties 
suppose to protect the domestic producers. GATT/WTO do proscribe export subsidies 
as “unfair competition” and allow importing countries to retaliate with protectionist 
countervailing duties. The net effect of the subsidy plus countervailing duty together 
determines the world welfare. 
 
Advocates of strategic trade policy support granting subsidies to strategic 
industries/firms5. This form of subsidy is different from the infant industry argument 
for protection. Countries may predominate in the export of certain products because 
they had firms that were foremost in technology and able to attain first-mover 
advantages in industries that would support only a few firms because of substantial 
economies of scale. Government should use subsidies to support promising firms in 
emerging industries and should provide this support until the domestic firms establish 
first-mover advantage in the world market. Both home market protection and export 
subsidies are advocated. For example the United States of America supports Boeing 
and a number of European countries support Airbus.   
 
IMPORT SUBSTITUTING INDUSTRIES 
Development economists justify import substituting industrial policies on a number of 
grounds. Given the low productivity and low income elasticity of demand for the 
primary goods mainly produced by developing nations known as periphery underwent 
long term deterioration of prices and short-term export revenue instability (Prebisch 
1984). Given the high productivity and high income elasticity of demand for the 
manufacturing goods produced by rich countries known as centre received 
continuously higher prices for their products6. If a secular decline of terms of trade of 
periphery is true forecast for future trends, long-lasting expansion of traditional 
exports cannot be relied upon for sustained long-run growth. It was felt that switching 
into import-substitution industrialisation was the only option for periphery to grow 
with the given export pessimism case7. Switching into import substituting industries 
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was also perceive as a means of reducing the income elasticity of demand in the 
periphery for its manufacturing imports from the centre. 
 
The classical economists and later structuralists brand the manufacturing sector as an 
engine of growth8. This sector relatively generates increasing returns in the long-run 
not only within the sector itself but also in the other major sectors, that is rising 
productivity as output expands. Manufacturing sector has the potential of interrelated 
branches of activities and generates greater linkages and externalities. Agricultural 
and service sectors do generate linkages. However, the expansion of these sectors 
does not offer specialisation and division of labour within the sectors as like 
manufacturing sector. Productivity gains and technical change arising in 
manufacturing sector pass on to these sectors through purchase of capital and 
intermediate goods. 
 
Switching into domestic production satisfying domestic demand replaces the imports. 
The government interventions in foreign trade and the price distortions arise due to 
that is to protect the import substituting manufacturing industries. Price distortions are 
expected to shelter the higher-cost local producers by allowing the domestic 
production more profitable. The above process can be an important strategy in raising 
manufacturing sector through foreign exchange savings and the generation of 
externalities and learning effects. 
 
The danger is that this strategy targets the internal demand and neglects the external 
demand from export sector. Weiss (1988) has noted developing countries failed to 
lower their imports, while reducing the exports below its long-run potential for many 
cases. One can look at various explanations for this. First the composition of imports 
may change but not overall imports that includes capital and intermediate goods. 
Second the growing income inequalities can lead to shifts in consumer demand 
towards import-intensive commodities. Finally there is also a tendency that import-
substitution policy creates biases in the incentive structure, lower the growth of 
potential exports. It is inevitable to call for an export-oriented policy at this stage 
which demand removal of biases in the incentive structure.  
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Externalities and Linkages 
Generation of externalities and linkages are vital step for import-substituting 
industrialisation process. Externalities are generally defined as the effects created by 
individual producers/consumers that are felt elsewhere in the economy not reflected in 
the cost and revenue of the originator of the effect. Technological externalities and 
pecuniary externalities are two types of externalities. For example 'Firm A' incurs cost 
for their worker training for future needs. Suppose the worker leaves from 'Firm A' 
and joins 'Firm B' then these potential benefits are lost and 'Firm A' is left with 
bearing cost. The expectation is that protected firms, in this case 'Firm A', can have 
the ability to expand their expenditure including expenditure on training; the rest of 
the firms benefit by workers with no cost. The above direct interdependence among 
producers can be referred as technological externalities.  
 
 
Figure 1: Pecuniary Externalities 
 
Figure 1 indicates some of the possible pecuniary externalities. Pecuniary externalities 
are defined as the effects that revealed in price terms through market mechanism. 
Suppose if expansion of textiles production by 'Firm B' is subject to increasing returns 
of scale then there will be cost reductions. So that garment producer of 'Firm C' 
generates higher profit. Growth of textile production by 'Firm B' will create a demand 
for cotton production by 'Firm A' and will create higher profits in 'Firm C'. These are 
positive pecuniary externalities. In case if output of textiles by 'Firm B' is higher cost 
or lower quality than the competitors, and 'Firm C' is compelled to use the textiles 
from 'Firm B' rather than alternatives then this situation generates negative pecuniary 
externalities. Economic planners usually target broad economic perspective and higher 
existence of positive externalities.  
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There are number of scepticism over externalities. First, one can argue that it would 
be less costly for the government to directly subsidise such worker training rather than 
blindly protecting the industry. Direct subsidisation for worker training avoids the 
consumer welfare loss arises from protection. Second, by definition import 
substituting industries focuses limited small domestic market and this is major 
constraint of achieving economies-of-scale in the process of industrialisation. 
  
Linkages are closely related with externalities and some times synonymous. It is 
narrowly defined as a series of production relationships in an intra-industry 
framework. Hirschman (1958) introduced backward and forward linkages reflect 
production interdependence. Backward linkage is from particular industry to its input 
suppliers. Forward linkage is from particular industry to its users.  
 
 
Figure 2: Backward and Forward Linkages 
 
Figure 2 shows the backward and forward linkages. The garment industry needs 
textiles; these links are referred to as direct backward linkages. Textiles generate the 
need for cotton and fertiliser; these are known as indirect linkages. Users can be final 
consumers, retailers, and wholesalers; these are known as forward linkages. The 
Leontief inverse of an input and output table incorporates total linkages, both direct 
and indirect. The expectation here is that the higher the total linkages, the greater will 
be the inducement to expansion. 
 
It is often argued that it is the manufacturing sector that generates higher linkages and 
having potential for generating higher externalities. Within manufacturing one should 
give main concern to the activities that form the maximum linkages. However, not all 
linkages create economically desirable outcomes, for example, establishing a garment 
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production creates a demand for textiles and encourage establishing higher capacity.  
If the domestic market is not adequate or the cost of production of textiles is relatively 
high then the cost of garment product is more than the world standard. If the garment 
industry is protected, leaving the industry profitable, then still the linkages can be 
justifiable. Linkages of this type will result in the establishment of a number of high 
cost supplying industries. 
 
Infant Industry 
A number of government interventions in foreign trade have the intention to promote 
infant industries. Imposing tariffs is one example, but this is not an effective method 
for a number of reasons. First, tariffs may not be an effective tool to target the specific 
industry. Second, tariffs are not easily removed once they are written into legislation 
and there is a danger that an infant never becomes efficient. Finally, tariffs generate 
both misallocation of resources and consumer welfare loss due to misalignment of 
domestic and world prices. A subsidy to an import substituting industry is an effective 
tool to target a specific industry9. Subsidising production can promote infant 
industries more cheaply compared to tariffs on imports. A subsidy can still lead to 
misallocation of resources but avoid consumer welfare loss due to the alignment of 
domestic and world prices. The other option is low-interest loans. If an industry’s 
current high costs are outweighed by the later cost reductions, then the industry can 
borrow against its own future profits. 
 
Advocates of protectionism promote the infant industry argument. This states that a 
temporary tariff is justified because it cuts down on imports while the infant-domestic 
industry learns how to produce at low enough costs to compete without the help of 
tariffs. Central to the argument is that new industries cannot be expected to compete 
on equal terms with established overseas producers. These industries need a limited 
period of protection from import competition while learning. The expectation is that, 




Figure3: Infant Industry: Learning and Externalities 
 
Weiss (1991) has depicted the infant industry arguments using diagrams that relate 
costs of production of infants at a point of time. This is shown in Figure 3. The 
vertical and horizontal axes represent costs/prices and time respectively. The real 
average cost curve of an individual producer is falling as learning takes place over 
time and represented by the curve 'AA'. The Cost, Insurance and Fright (CIF) price of 
comparable imports remains constant in real terms and represented by 'MM". At the 
time of 't' the infant reached the international standards. If costs fall beyond 't' the firm 
can compete in the export market. The curve 'EE' represents externalities. This curve 
is derived from the infant's own cost curve 'AA' minus the external benefits per unit of 
output that are created for others. With the inclusion of 'EE' curve the maturity occurs 
at time 't''; the learning costs are lower; the gains after 't'' are greater. 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates that infant-industry protection generates more benefits 
wherever there are positive externalities. But to be realistic it is important that one 
should show more than the costs fall to international standard. First, this can be done 
by a detailed cost-benefit evaluation of the infant. Over the lifetime of the investment 
of an infant the discounted value of the later benefits should offset the discounted 
value of the initial costs. Second, the assumption that international prices remain 
constant is unrealistic. International prices can fall with the improvement in 
productivity. Finally, only firms which are prepared to understand, adapt and 




The import substitution approach is subject to a number of criticisms. First, a real 
possibility of government failures and the costs associated with resulting from the 
attitudes of bureaucrats, influence of powerful pressure groups and substituting private 
interests on the expense of public interests by politicians and employees needs to be 
addressed. Second, prevailing foreign exchange controls may tend to promote the use 
of more inappropriate capital-intensive techniques of production. Third, exchange 
controls and protections together may result in a vast increase in rent-seeking 
activities. Forth, a forgoing view is that infant industries in developing countries have 
had a tendency never to grow up10. Finally, import-substitution policy creates biases in 
the incentive structure and lowers the growth of potential exports in the long term. 
This necessitates the need of export-oriented policy over time11.  
 
EXPORT ORIENTATION: TRADE LIBERALISATION 
The concept ‘trade liberalisation’ does not mean complete free trade, but fewer trade 
barriers or a neutral trade regime. The process of removal of quota and tariff may 
continue until a neutral trade regime appears. A neutral trade regime may be defined 
as a situation with equal incentives to domestic sales and exports. Trade protection 
instruments such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers tend to discriminate between 
domestic and border prices. Trade reforms in this respect are likely to reduce the gap 
between domestic and border prices and tends to narrow the market prices with 
opportunity costs. Bhagwati (1978) defined a neutral trade regime as in equation (1) 
where 
 
MX EEREER =         (1) 
 
where XEER  and MEER indicate the effective exchange rate for exports and for 
imports respectively. The former refers to the number of units of domestic currency 
that can be obtained for a dollar worth of exports by considering all factors that affect 
the price of exports, such as export duties and subsidies. The latter refers to the 
number of units of domestic currency that would be paid for a dollar worth of 
imports by considering all factors that affect the price of imports such as tariffs and 
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surcharges. It is assumed that MEER determines the nominal protection for import-
competing firms selling in the domestic market. In a situation where: 
 
MX EEREER <         (2) 
 
the policies are directed toward import substitution, and where 
 
MX EEREER >         (3) 
 
the policies are directed towards over-subsidization of exports. The process of moving 
towards a neutral trade regime may be defined as trade liberalisation. 
 
As a result of liberalisation, some activities may contract while others may expand. As 
resources in the contracting activities are likely to be affected, this would involve 
some political implications. Macroeconomic imbalances such as higher inflation and 
severe balance of payments problems are likely with liberalisation. To avoid 
uncertainties Michaely (1986) suggested an optimal path to trade liberalisation. 
Michaely recommended a multi-stage implementation, as being superior to a one-
stage implementation on the grounds that one-stage implementation is not feasible 
politically or socially, as this would lead to greater unemployment and larger changes 
in income distribution. 
 
Michaely further argues that the desirable first step is to eliminate all forms of 
quantitative restrictions. Further he suggested a uniform treatment of activities as far 
as tariff reductions are concerned. Three alternative “uniform” paths can be looked 
into. First, equiproportional(across-the board) reduction of protection of various 
activities. This would lead to a gradual reduction of the protection system. Second, 
equally large absolute reductions between various activities. The third method is 
named the ‘concertina method’. In the initial stage of the policy, all protection rates 
above a certain ceiling are lowered to that ceiling, with no changes in other rates. The 
next step is that all rates are again brought to the lower ceiling and so on. This would 
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allow consistency in the lowering of the variance in the protection system. This tends 
now to be the approach used as bringing highest net benefit. 
 
It is recognised within the Neoclassical literature that effective trade liberalisation 
requires the effective operation of all inter-related and inter-dependent markets, such 
as those for foreign exchange, finance, labour and capital market. In the absence of 
free movements in related markets, the benefits that accrue from liberalisation may be 
significantly reduced. Macroeconomic policies appear to be important in determining 
the survivability of trade liberalisation. Trade liberalisation may not be effective in 
countries with growing fiscal deficits, worsening external balance and rising inflation. 
For example, with the liberalisation, inflationary pressures lead to appreciation in the 
real exchange rate and worsen the current account deficit. High real lending and 
excessive debt-burden rate due to inflationary pressures lead to lower investment. 
 
Adjustment assistance is the policy of compensating those jobs and investments that 
are displaced by import competition. Greater import competition entails displacement 
costs, in terms of worker, capital and other resources. Job losses need to be addressed 
in order to avoid the social and political unrest. Who pays this cost? One can argue 
that as long as the free-trade policy brings net gains to the nation, the gainers can 
compensate the injured while still retain the net gains from the free trade. The 
Government can play the mediator role between gainers and losers. This is referred to 
as adjustment assistance. This assistance can be used to relocate and retrain workers 
(and firms) for reemployment in sectors where employment is expanding. 
 
TRADE EFFICIENCY 
Economy as a whole 
Government intervention in the form of foreign trade protection creates direct and 
indirect costs to the economy as a whole. The misallocation of resources in production 
and the reduction in consumer welfare because of the misalignment of domestic and 
foreign prices generate direct costs to the economy. Indirect costs derive from 
unproductive activities associated with protection such as evading tariffs, under-




Kirkpatrick and Weiss (1992) explained some of the above impacts diagrammatically 
using the standard production possibility frontier in a two good model of cloth and 
rice. It is assumed in ‘Figure 4’ that protection creates costs, not benefits. The 
production frontier QQ signifies the maximum output of the economy in a situation 
where resources and technology are limited. WW and DD indicate international and 
domestic price lines respectively with DD incorporating some form of protection for 
cloth. In a free trade situation, ‘A’ is the efficient production point on the frontier, 
whilst trade along WW allows the combination of goods ‘X’ to be attained. In the 
situation of protection, ‘B’ is the production point and trade under these restricted 
conditions along WW will allow a lower combination of goods ‘X1’ to be obtained. 
‘R1W’ is the allocative efficiency loss measured in terms of rice along the horizontal 





Apart from allocative inefficiency, protection generates ‘X- inefficiency’, either by 
encouraging rent-seeking behaviour in order to receive preferential treatment from 
protection or by creating negative incentive effects. These processes raise unit costs. 
This can be illustrated by shifting the production possibility frontier to the left to 
Q1Q1(Figure 5). Under protection, point ‘C’ is the production point now, and trade 
along ‘PW’ allows the combination of goods ‘X2’. Now ‘R2W’ is the loss due to 




If the assumption that protection creates costs but no benefits is removed, then there is 
a possibility that the frontier can shift outward relative to the free trade position. The 
possibility arises when there are dynamic benefits from trade protection. In figure 6, a 
new frontier Q2Q2 is drawn, which as a result of protection is skewed towards greater 
cloth production compared to the original frontier QQ. In this figure, production under 
protection is at point ‘E’, and trading along ‘PW’ allows a combination of goods ‘X3’, 
which is above the original free trade combination of ‘X’. The gain in terms of rice is 
R3W. These are alternative views on the merits of trade liberalisation. Kirkpatrick and 




The neo-classical literature on industrialisation noted that the level of protection was 
high in developing countries and this, in turn, led to discriminatory impacts not only 
on import-competing industries but also various other branches and sectors. Export-
 19
oriented industries need to be competitive in the world market to progress. To be 
competitive, the economy should move to an export promotion strategy which 
encourages greater competition and associated productivity gains, technological 
know-how and knowledge of international standards. Protectionist policies allow and 
maintain an exchange rate well above the free trade situation and result in local 
exporters receiving less local currency for a given unit of exports than the free trade 
situation. In addition, import controls raise domestic prices. Exporters are forced to 
use domestically produced inputs, which are relatively expensive and possibly inferior 
to that those available in foreign markets. 
 
Protecting the industrial sector may harm the agricultural sector and generate price 
distortions in factor markets. Supporting the industrial sector at the expense of the 
agricultural sector can result in the agricultural sector suffering from an anti-export 
bias. A protectionist policy is just one among a range of government interventions that 
introduce distortions in factor prices. It is widely recognised that there is a divergence 
between the opportunity cost of wages and interest rates and the market price of wages 
and interest rates in developing countries. The need to introduce shadow price 
estimates of labour and capital into calculations of investment viability is essential in 
this circumstance. Therefore, it is argued that removal of protection is essential to 
promote efficient resource allocation among branches and sectors of the economy. 
 
At the industry level the removal of trade protection generates efficiency in a number 
of ways. First, by eliminating foreign exchange constraints it increases the importing 
capacity of the economy. Second, by removing quantitative restrictions, it reduces the 
wastefulness from the stockpiling of goods in expectation of later shortages. In 
addition, it reduces the forced inactivity of resources due to the shortages of matching 
import components. Third, by eliminating X-inefficiency it raises the efficiency level 
in an industry and by eliminating monopoly profits it allows optimum resource 
allocation in an industry. Thus, it is expected that the process can lead to 






It is argued in welfare economics that monopoly leads to inefficiency in pricing. 
Profit-maximising behaviour will ensure economic efficiency only in the context of a 
perfectly competitive market. Since protection allows domestic firms to operate under 
either monopoly or monopolistic competition, a rise in profits may represent the 
exercise of the firm’s monopoly power in the market, rather than an improvement in 
efficiency. 
 
Figure 7 compares the firm in perfect competition and in monopoly. In perfect 
competition, the firm faces a perfectly elastic demand curve, where average revenue 
(AR) is equal to marginal revenue (MR). In equilibrium, the firm is earning normal 
profits and the average total cost (ATC) is tangent to the demand curve. With profit 
maximisation, marginal revenue (MR) is equal marginal cost (MC), this leads to the 
efficient price P, where P = MC. In monopoly, the firm/industry faces a down-ward 
sloping demand curve. Profit maximisation behaviour (MC = MR) results in the price 





At the market level it is expected that with the opening to trade, domestic prices have 
to equate with the average cost of the firms in operation, since they cannot make 
excess profits. The protection factor is included in the present prices and cost structure 
of the firms. Thus liberalisation is expected to reduce domestic prices and this will 
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induce some of the inefficient firms to leave the industry. Thus liberalisation will 




A key argument behind trade liberalisation and an Export Promotion (EP) policy is 
that export expansion increases international competition and forces domestic firms to 
achieve international standards. At the firm level export expansion and import 
liberalisation creates an implicit ‘Challenge Response’ mechanism among domestic 
firms and this, it is argued, will eventually increase domestic efficiency. 
 
‘Best practice’ production frontiers illustrate three types of technical advance which 
trade can promote12. Figure 8 illustrates the optimum point at the present state of 
technology. The vertical axis shows unit labour requirement and the horizontal axis 
shows unit capital requirement. PPo is the ‘Best Practice’ production frontier 
estimated from a sample of firms and represents the firm’s existing state of 
technology. The efficient decision lies at the point where the relative factor price line 
is tangent to the production frontier PPo. F1, F2 and F3 are the factor price lines and 
represent the relative prices of a unit of labour and a unit of capital. Point B is 
technically efficient since it is on the frontier but point ‘C’ is technically inefficient. 
The overall inefficiency of point C is OD/OC. This can be divided into allocative 
(OD/OB) and technical (OB/OC) components. Point ‘A’ is the least cost techniqe in 
terms of factor prices and the existing state of technology. When a firm moves from 
point ‘B’ to point ‘A’ it regains its allocative efficiency. In other words, the already 
existing inefficiency, perhaps due to misallocation of resources has now been 
removed. Firms that are at point ‘C’ or point ‘B’ are inefficient and this may be partly 







It is also expected that investment by enterprises in respect to trade liberalisation may 
promote research and development activities, movement of relative factor prices, 
quality control and staff training and move the firm to the new frontier PP1, towards 
the origin. The proponents of liberal trade regimes agree that, in the long-run, further 
gains from improved allocative efficiency will not remain and only benefits from 
improved technical efficiency will continue. Pack (1988: 364) argued that 
liberalisation may have a substantial initial impact but not yield any steady-state 
benefits. However, since all the elements are subject to change in the long-term, as a 
result of foreign or domestic technical change and of changing prices both 
internationally and domestically, the concept of long-term productivity growth is 
ambiguous. We need further evidence in this regard. 
 
MEASURES OF EFFICIENCY 
Static measures of efficiency  
The impact of trade policy on static efficiency is widely measured in terms of 
Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC), Effective Rate of Protection (ERP), Cost-
Benefit (CB) and Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) estimates. 
 
Nominal protection coefficient (NPC) 
Protection in the form of quota, tariff, taxes and subsidies on inputs and outputs 
generates drastic changes in resource allocation and output levels. This necessitates an 
awareness of the end result of protection. The Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC) 
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can be defined as the ratio of the domestic price to the world price for a comparable 
commodity. The estimates of NPC will not capture the entire effects of protection.  
NPC represents the price rising effect of tariffs on a product and can be defined as 
 
NPC = Wd PP /          (4) 
 
where dP  is domestic price and wP  is world price. If NPC is greater than one then 
government protects producers. 
 
 
Effective rate of protection (ERP) 
Effective Rate of Protection (ERP) is defined in the literature as the percentage excess 
of domestic value-added obtainable by reason of the imposition of tariffs and other 
protective measures on the product and its inputs over value-added at world prices. In 








         (5) 
 
where *iV is value-added at domestic prices in activity ‘i’ and iV is value-added at 
world prices in activity ‘i’, under liberal trade. Other things being equal, it is expected 
that the higher the ERP level in an activity ‘i’ the greater will be output as compared 
with what its output would be in the absence of protection. The higher the anti-exports 
bias the greater the incentive to domestic production. The following situations tend to 
increase the ERP, (a) high import duty on output and low import duty on inputs, (b) 
low export tax on output and high export tax on inputs, and © imposition of licensing 
on output. The ERP is not strictly a measure of the efficiency with which resources are 




It is widely believed that market prices often fail to represent national opportunity 
costs, so that an alternative basis of valuation of an investment or project is required. 
Price distortions arise for various reasons such as state intervention in economic 
activities and lack of resource mobility. Where distortions are important shadow 
prices should be used for commodities or factors instead of prevailing market prices. 
 
Cost benefit analysis is a commonly used technique for appraising new investments in 
public projects by incorporating economic prices. It is used for measuring the 
efficiency of existing projects. To decide whether an existing project continuously 
requires government support through either protection or subsidy this analysis can be 
used. In addition, this technique can be employed as part of an interventionist policy 
that attempts to direct private sector activity. 
 
An investment or a project may be beneficial to the country if NPV > 0 and IRR > d 
are satisfied: 
 




∑         (6) 
 
and NPV, NB and IRR refer to “net present value”, “net benefit” and “internal rate of 
return” respectively. One can derive NPV by using the appropriate discount rate (r). 
When NPV > 0, it means that in today’s value terms, the stream of economic net 
benefits would be positive. The higher the r, is the lower the NPV. The IRR criterion 









NPV          (7) 
 
In other words, one can accept a project as feasible if it has an IRR greater than the 
interest rate (d > r). If one invests in this particular project, then one receives ‘d’ 
whilst elsewhere one receives a rate of return of ‘r’. 
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Domestic resource cost 
The Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) is an estimate of the opportunity cost in terms of 
domestic resources of generating a net marginal unit of foreign exchange. It gives the 
cost of domestic resources that are necessary to save or earn one unit of foreign 
exchange by producing a unit of value-added, for a particular plant or enterprise. In 













DRC    (8) 
 
where NiKiLi andaaa , refer to the units of labour, capital and non-traded goods 
respectively required per unit of output ‘i’. L, K and N indicate the unit market prices 
of labour, capital and non-traded goods respectively. NKL andCFCFCF ,  represent the 
conversion factors of labour, capital and non-traded costs respectively14. ti andPP  are 
the world prices of output ‘i’ and traded input ‘t’ respectively. Tia  represents the unit 
of input ‘T’ per unit of ‘i’. ∑ refers to summation. 
 
In the algebraic notation of the DRC ratio, non-tradables are in the numerator and 
tradables in the denominator. To determine whether or not a good falls into the 
tradable or non-tradable category, one must look at its ultimate impact on exports and 
imports and this often depends on judgement. If extra demand that arises in the 
domestic economy is met by imports or exports then the item falls into the tradable 
category. For consistency it is suggested that non-traded goods should be decomposed 
into non-traded and traded components and traded inputs be included in the 
denominator of the DRC ratio (Bruno 1972). The same treatment is appropriate to the 
annualised capital stock used in the calculations. The part of capital that is itself 
imported should be included in denominator while keeping domestically produced 
capital in the numerator (Bruno 1972). 
 
The DRC criterion is an explicit expression of the comparative cost principle in 
international trade. A country has a comparative cost advantage if DRC < SER, where 
SER is the shadow exchange rate. This is the situation in which a country experiences 
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a positive net foreign exchange impact. If DRC > SER, then it reflects comparative 
disadvantage and a negative net foreign exchange benefit. 
 
Two types of DRCs can be distinguished, one ex-ante and the other ex-post. The 
former is often used in micro level project evaluation and the latter for industry level 
cost of protection studies. DRCs at the ex-ante level can be made equivalent to 
conventional CB ratios or IRR15. DRCs at the ex-post level have two wings of which 
one includes only short-run variable cost (short-run DRCs) and the other includes past 
investment costs (long-run DRCs). The long-run DRCs incorporate the annualised 
replacement costs in the prices of the base year. Still, if ex-post long-run DRCs are 
static single year measure, they are inferior to the CB ratio of IRR which cover the 
whole life of an activity. 
 
The main differences that can be identified between ERP and DRC measures is that in 
the case of the DRC shadow prices are used, whilst the ERP is based on market prices. 
In the absent of shadow pricing these two measures are same provided equivalent 
assumptions are adopted. 
 
Dynamic measures of efficiency 
Productivity growth 
The impact of trade reform can also be assessed in dynamic terms. There can be three 
possible links between trade liberalisation and productivity growth. First, opening to 
trade encourages foreign competition and ‘challenge response’ and hence affects 
domestic efficiency. Second, the availability of imported inputs may lead to cost 
reductions partly due to improved capacity utilisation. Third, expansion of output due 
to opening to trade reduces the production costs and hence leads to better productivity 
performance.  
 
Labour productivity and total factor productivity growth measures indicate the change 
in technology in the production function as well as a number of other effects such as 
changes in allocative and technical efficiency and in capacity utilisation rates. Labour 
productivity may be defined as, 
- output per worker 
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- output per manhour, and 
- value-added per worker 
 
Total factor productivity is often referred as the ‘residual’ or the index of ‘technical 
progress’. In other words this part of the changes in output cannot be explained by the 
changes of total inputs. The interpretation of the changes in total factor productivity 
differs according to the way in which inputs are measured and specified. When there 
is error in measurement it is wrong to conclude that the residual is productivity 
growth. Total factor productivity may be defined as 
 
TFP = KaLaVA 21 −−         (9)   
 
where VA refers the growth of value-added at constant prices, L refers the growth of 
labour inputs in number of workers, K indicates the growth of capital inputs at 
constant prices and 1a  and 2a the mean shares of labour and capital respectively. 
Share of labour is the average of the ratio of wages divided by value-added at the 
beginning and the end of the period under study. Share of capital is the average of the 
ratio of non-wage value-added divided by value-added divided by value-added at the 
beginning and end of the period of study. 
 
Price-cost margins 
There are links between price-cost margins and trade liberalisation. First, foreign 
competition and free entry restrain the exercise of market power by domestic firms in 
the domestic market. In other words, import competition may weaken the collusive 
agreements of domestic firms. This eventually leads them to cut their prices in order 
to avoid their loss of market share. Second, foreign competition improves the 
productive efficiency of inefficient producers and allows them to cut their prices. 
Third, as oligopolistic export firms tend to face greater difficulties in achieving tacit 
collusion with importers, largely because of communication, they are forced to cut 
their prices to compete in the export market. Finally, there is a possibility that an 
import competition induces mergers among domestic firms, as long as imports are 
close substitutes for domestic products.  
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The monopolistic profit maximisation model best explains the theoretical aspect 
of the price cost margin (PCM) measure. The model can be written as 
 
MC = MR = P(1 - 1/n)       (10) 
 







         (11) 
 
The left hand side of the equation gives PCM and that is equal to the inverse of the 
elasticity of demand. Also, if MC equals average variable cost, then one can show that 
the ratio of profit to sales revenue (thus multiplying the numerator and denominator of 
PCM by output) is equal to the reciprocal of the demand elasticity. This is a version of 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) models, where performance (PCM) is 
determined by structure (n) and conduct is monopolistic. 
  
Export growth 
Export growth of a country may be an alternative measure of competitiveness. Trade 
liberalisation eliminates restricted markets due to protection allows domestic 
producers to access inputs cheaper than the earlier protected system. Growth in 
exports is likely by enhancing price competitiveness, increase in external demand and 
reductions in internal demand. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Structuralists, who believe in government involvement in foreign trade, hold the 
strong view that import-substituting industrialisation can be an important strategy for 
raising earnings and savings of foreign exchange, generating externalities and learning 
effects. In general, misallocation of resources and consumer welfare loss due to 
misalignment of domestic and world prices and rent-seeking activities are costs 
associated with protectionism. Import-substituting strategy creates biases in the 
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incentive structure and likely to reduce the potential exports. Focus is also on limited 
domestic market where industry unlikely to reap the benefits of economies-of-scale.  
 
The expectation of the trade reforms is to generate trade efficiency in the short-run by 
eliminating allocative and technical inefficiency that possibly arises from trade 
protection. Long-run productivity growth is ambiguous one as there is vast range of 
changes in technical conditions and prices both internationally and domestically. It is 
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1 Seven of the entire episodes experienced a relaxation of quantitative restrictions. Seven 
other episodes had low quantitative restrictions to begin with. The rest experienced tariff 
cuts. Authors found that there appears to be not a single case in which higher tariffs were 
consciously used to improve neutrality. 
2 For a comprehensive account, see Helleiner (1990). 
3 Voluntary export restraints mean that the importing country gives exporters monopoly 
power, forces them to take it, and calls their compliance "voluntary" (Lindert 1996, p.140). 
4 The United States was the originator of about 54 out of the world's 89 major embargo 
occurrence between 1945 and 1983. 
5 New trade theorists introduced strategic trade policy argument. For review, see P.R. 
Krugman (1992). 
6 Development economists in the 1950s and 1960s, for example Prebisch, Nurkse, Lewis and 
Myrdal, shared the view of  'export pessimism' regarding traditional primary exports from 
developing countries.  
7 Export pessimism case was not completely acceptable as developing countries had the 
capabilities of expanding non-traditional exports or expanding south-south customs unions as 
a means of widening their markets. 
8 Structuralists are pessimistic in their view of how markets perform, but optimistic 
concerning the government's involvement in problem solving. Weiss (1988 pp107-16) argues 
for and against the industrial specialisation and dynamic increasing returns suggested by 
structuralists.  
9 Lindert (1996) pp.159-62 argues that production subsidy is preferable to the tariff in an 
import substituting industry since it achieves any given expansion of output or jobs at lower 
social costs. If the priority is to promote jobs then a subsidy tied to the number of workers 
employed might be better than a subsidy tied to output.  
10 For details Grabowski (1994) and Weiss (1988). 
11 Prebisch (1984) has shown his dissatisfaction of policies which create excessive biases 
against exporting. 
12 Farrell (1957) has used the term ‘best practice’ for the production frontier and has shown 
technical efficiency and allocative efficiency in a systematic manner. 
13 See for example Weiss (1991) for a detailed derivation of DRC. 
14 A conversion factor may be defined as the ratio of the shadow to the market price of any 
activity in an economy. 
15 Warr (1983) concludes that the DRC criterion is capable of distinguishing between projects 
generating positive and negative net present value. He found that all three criteria – CB ratio, 
IRR and DRC – are helpful in distinguishing desirable from undesirable projects but, none of 
them can be relied upon to rank a set of mutually exclusive projects correctly. 
